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UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE CONSUMER-
BARQUIS v. MERCHANTS COLLECTION
ASSOCIATION, INC.
In Barquis v. Merchants Collection Association, Inc.,1 indi-
vidual debtors successfully invoked California's unfair competition stat-
ute, section 3369 of the Civil Code,2 to enjoin a collection agency
from knowingly misfiling complaints against debtors in order to pro-
cure default judgments. The California Supreme Court, in a unani-
mous opinion, broadly interpreted section 3369, expanding its appli-
cation to injured consumers. This expansion had both a proced-
ural and substantive aspect. First, the court liberally construed the
standing requirement of section 3369, holding that the plaintiffs as
private individuals could bring an action for injunctive relief under this
section without a showing of competitive injury.3  Secondly, the court
interpreted "unlawful business practice" to enlarge the range of activities
enjoinable under the statute. Specifically, the Barquis court reasoned
that because the defendant's debt collection activities violated certain
process statutes,4 these activities therefore constituted an "unlawful
business practice" under section 3369.' The court refused to limit the
applicability of the statute to more traditional commercial notions of
1. 7 Cal. 3d 94, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (West 1970), as amended, Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1084,
§ 1, at 2190 provides in p9art: "(2) Any person performing or proposing to perform an
act of unfair competition within this State may be enjoined in any court of competent
jurisdiction.
(3) As used in this section, unfair competition shall mean and include unlawful,
unfair or fraudulent business practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading ad-
vertising and any act denounced by Business and Professions Code Sections 17500 to
17535, inclusive.
(4) As used in this section, the term person shall mean and include natural
persons, corporations, firms, partnerships, joint stock companies, associations and other
organizations of persons.
(5) Actions for injunction under this section may be prosecuted by the Attorney
General or any district attorney in this State in the name of the people of the State of
California upon their own complaint or upon the complaint of any board, officer,
person, corporation or association or by any person acting for the interests of itself,
its members or the general public."
3. 7 Cal. 3d at 110-11, 496 P.2d at 829, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
4. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. §§ 395, 396(a) (West Supp. 1972). See text ac-
companying notes 31-32 infra.
5. 7 Cal. 3d at 113, 496 P.2d at 831, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
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unlawful business practice.6 This note will critically analyze the effect
of both holdings and will explore future implications of section 3369
as a remedy for consumers.
Unfair Competition and Section 3369:
Changing Conception
The legal concept "unfair competition" is as chameleonic as the
two words which make up its title. It is one of those classic legal doc-
trines which does not lend itself to ready definition despite the fact
that writers have described it as 'one of the romances of legal his-
tory.' 7
The doctrine of unfair competition had its inception as a tort con-
cept.' Initially the interest protected by the remedy was business good-
will and reputation.9  Accordingly, unfair competition applied to
"wrongful conduct in commercial enterprises which resulted in busi-
ness loss to another, ordinarily by the use of unfair means in drawing
away customers from a competitor."10
The California legislature altered this common law approach
in 1933" by completely revising section 3369 of the Civil Code. 12 This
revision defined unfair competition as an "unfair or fraudulent busi-
ness practice and unfair, untrue or misleading advertising. '13  In 1963
the section was amended to include "unlawful . . . business practice
6. See text accompanying notes 62-72 infra.
7. Netterville, California Law of Unfair Competition: Unprivileged Imitation,
28 S. CAL. L. REv. 240 (1955).
8. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 956 (4th ed. 1971).
9. See Schwartz v. Slenderella Systems, Inc., 43 Cal. 2d 107, 112, 271 P.2d 857,
860 (1954); MacSweeney Enterprises, Inc. v. Tarantino, 106 Cal. App. 2d 504, 511,
235 P.2d 266, 270 (1951); 1 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADE-
MARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 4.1, at 109 (3d ed. 1967).
10. People ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 770,
20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 (1962).
Examples of the earlier concept of unfair competition include: simulation of the
appearance of marketable goods, Haeger Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, 123 F. Supp.
261 (S.D. Cal. 1954); tradename infringement, Academy of Motion Picture Arts and
Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal. 2d 685, 104 P.2d 650 (1940); imitation of literary or
artistic work, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Lee, 212 Cal. App. 2d 23, 27 Cal. Rptr.
833 (1963).
11. Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 953, § 1, at 2482 (now Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1084, § 1,
at 2190, amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (West 1970) ).
12. The old section 3369 was not a statute codifying the law on unfair competi-
tion but concerned equity's refusal to provide specific relief against a penal law, except
with respect to nuisance and unfair competition. This remains the first subsection of
the current section 3369. See Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1084, § 1(1), at 2190, amending
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (West 1970).
13. Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 953, § 1, at 2482 (now Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1084, § 1,
at 2190, amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (West 1970) ).
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.... *-14 The legislature added a further adjective in 1972, thus
maling the section read in pertinent part: "unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or mislead-
ing advertising."' 5
The legislature not only changed the common law definition of
unfair competition by these amendments, it also altered the traditional
concepts of the right to bring an action for unfair competition. Un-
der the common law, relief from unfair competition was limited to
actions by one competitor against a wrongdoing competitor."0 Section
3369 is much less restrictive in specifying who can sue. Subsec-
tion five allows the attorney general or any district attorney to sue but
adds that "any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or
the general public" can seek a section 3369 injunction.' s
Development of Section 3369
Simultaneously with these statutory changes, the concept of un-
fair competition was afforded an increasingly liberal interpretation in
the courts. In Athens Lodge No. 70 v. Wilson, 9 the court held that
unlawful competition could involve noncommercial organizations.
Other cases also diluted the concept of competition by holding that
14. Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 1606, § 1, at 3184 (emphasis added).
15. Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1084, § 1(3), at 2190, amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 3369
(West 1970) (emphasis added). Also encompassed within the definition are any acts
prohibited by CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500-535 (West 1964). Section 3370 of
the Civil Code extends the definition of unfair competition to any act denounced by
the "Unfair Practices Act," CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE H8 17000-101 (West 1964).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3370 (West 1970).
16. See People ex. rel. Mosk v. National Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765,
770, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 (1962); 1 H. NIMs, THE LAw OF UNFAIR CO MPETITION
AND TRADE-MARKS, H8 8-9 (4th ed. 1947); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF
TORTs 954-56 (4th ed. 1971); Callmann, What Is Unfair Competition?, 28 GEo. L.J.
585, 594-602 (1940).
17. Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1084, § 1(5), at 2190, amending CAi. Civ. CODE § 3369
(West 1970) (emphasis added).
18. Section 17535 of the Business and Professions Code contains identical word-
ing to subsection five of section 3369. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17535 (West
1964).
To obtain an injunction under section 3369, after standing is determined, it is not
necessary to allege irreparable injury. "The theory is that when a legislative body has
authorized the injunctive remedy for the violation of a statute, it has determined as a
matter of law that irreparable injury attends the violation of the statute." Paul v.
Wadler, 209 Cal. App. 2d 615, 625, 26 Cal. Rptr. 341, 347 (1962). Also no intent to
defraud or deceive need be shown; the unfairness of the competition is sufficient.
Hair v. McGuire, 188 Cal. App. 2d 348, 10 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1961). And, at least as
pertains to the Attorney General, there may be no necessity of proving any damage,
potential or existing, at all. See 29 Op. CAL. Arr'y. Gm. 175 (1957).
19. 117 Cal. App. 2d 322, 255 P.2d 482 (1953) (a fraternal organization can
sue a rival fraternal club).
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the competition could be indirect. For example, in Academy of
Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Benson2" the famed motion pic-
ture academy alleged that a dramatic school's appropriation of the
name "The Hollywood Motion Picture Academy" constituted unfair
competition because of the similarity in business titles. Even though
there was no direct competition between the two entities, the school
was enjoined from using its chosen name because of the consequences
which could result to the plaintiff's reputation from the confusion. 2'
Finally, dicta in the earlier cases indicated that the doctrine of un-
fair competition was not founded solely on the protection of a property
right, but also "upon the right of the public to protection from fraud
and deceit." 22
Prior to the Barquis case, the major departure from traditional
ideas of unfair competition occurred in People ex rel. Mosk v. Na-
tional Research Co.23  In that case a company servicing debt collec-
tion agencies mailed "skip tracers" to debtors' last known residences in
order to learn the debtors' current addresses. The company's locator
forms simulated state government forms, such as those sent by the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles. The attorney general brought suit under
section 3369 on two distinct grounds. First, he argued that this
practice constituted unfair competition with the state government. 24
Secondly, the attorney general contended that the public had been
misled and that because the test of unfair competition was public de-
ception, an injunction should issue on this ground as well.2 5 Both
arguments were accepted. After a review of the development of the
statute, the court concluded "that the equitable relief authorized by
Civil Code section 3369 [was] not circumscribed by any prerequi-
site showing that the conduct in question be limited to the field of
business competition."2 6  The court also suggested that the current
tendency in the area of unfair competition was "to redefine the ac-
tion as one against unfair business practices, rather than unfair
competition, and, as a general rule, competition [was] not regarded
as a necessary ingredient.1''27
This opinion in National Research thus continued the line of cases
20. 15 Cal. 2d 685, 104 P.2d 650 (1940).
21. Id. at 689-90, 104 P.2d at 652.
22. American Philatelic Soc'y v. Claibourne, 3 Cal. 2d 689, 698, 46 P.2d 135,
140 (1935). Accord, Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal.
2d 685, 691, 104 P.2d 650, 653 (1940).
23. 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962).
24. Id. at 768-69, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
25. Id. noted in 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 304, 305-06 (1963).
(1963).
26. 201 Cal. App. 2d at 771, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
27. Id.
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liberally explaining the competition component of section 3369. Of
even greater significance, however, was the court's willingness to en-
tertain the suit on grounds of public deception alone. In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied heavily on an analogy to the cases
construing the Federal Trade Commission Act,28 a similarly drafted
federal law. Here the court found abundant precedent awarding re-
lief to protect the public in the absence of private competition. 29
Summing up the holding of National Research, one commentator has
observed that "[i]nsofar as the court held that an action may be
brought for the direct protection of the public from unfair or deceptive
acts, it departed from the traditional concept of unfair competition
which usually involves the protection of reputation and goodwill."3 0
Barquis v. Merchants Collection Association, Inc.
Against this background of statutory and case law evolution fav-
orable to the consuming public, Barquis emerged in 1972. Appel-
lants were individual consumers with charge accounts at large de-
partment stores. When the appellants' balances became overdue,
their accounts were assigned to the respondent collection agency. Ap-
pellants contended that the collection agency had filed claims against
them in venues which were not permissible under section 395 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.3 1 It was alleged that these claims were
knowingly misfiled for the express purpose of impairing appellants'
opportunity to defend. Furthermore, it was argued that the agency
failed to state sufficient facts in their form complaints to deter-
mine correct venue, a violation of section 396(a) of the Code of Civil
Procedure.2 Appellants therefore sought injunctive3 relief under
28. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
29. 201 Cal. App. 2d at 773, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
30. 36 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 304, 306 (1963). After the National Research decision
sanctioned the Attorney General's power to seek injunctive relief for the protection of
the public, the Attorney General's Consumer Fraud Unit became active in enforcing
laws concerning unfair competition and other types of business fraud oriented toward
the public. 4 U.C. DAVIS L. R v. 35, 43 (1971). However, the Attorney General's
best results have been in securing stipulated injunctions. Project, The Direct Selling
Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 883, 963-65 (1969). There have
thus been few section 3369 appellate cases directly involving the Attorney General
since National Research. Barquis v. Merchant's Collection Ass'n, Inc., 7 Cal. 3d 94,
113 n.14, 496 P.2d 817, 830-31 n.14, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745, 758-59 n.14.
31. Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 832, § 1, at 1447, amending CAL. CODE Crv. PROC.
§ 395 (West 1954).
32. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 396(a) (West Supp. 1972).
33. Section 3369 is limited to injunctive relief. See Czap v. Credit Bureau,
7 Cal. App. 3d 1, 86 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1970) for a cause of action for damages against
similar collection agency practices.
In Czap defendant collection agency repeatedly attempted to garnish the plaintiff
debtor's exempt wages. Plaintiff sought general and punitive damages on the theory
February 19731 UNFAIR COMPEITION
section 3369 on the theory that respondents' actions constituted un-
fair competition. 34  Two main arguments were advanced in denial of
the appellants' claims: first, that the appellants as private individuals
lacked standing to sue under section 3369; and, secondly, that re-
spondents' activity though unlawful did not amount to an unlawful
business practice as contemplated by section 3369.11
The Standing Question
Subsection five of section 3369,36 when read literally, imposes no
special standing restrictions. That is, any person acting on his own
that this action constituted a violation of section 6947(j) of the Business and Profes-
sions Code, prohibiting a collection agency from engaging in "any unfair or misleading
practices or resort[ing] to any illegal means or methods or collection." CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 6947(j) (West Supp. 1972). The court held that while no remedy
existed within the statute, the agency's conduct was actionable on the grounds that
the statute embodied public policy and any member of the public designed to be pro-
tected could sue on the theory of a tort in essence. 7 Cal. App. 3d at 6, 86 Cal. Rptr.
at 420.
Also, if the collection agency's actions amount to abuse of process, as they did
in both Czap and Barquis, damages can be awarded. See note 34 infra, for a dis-
cussion of the abuse of process cause of action in Barquis.
Section 3370.1 of the Civil Code, enacted after the Barquis decision now allows a
civil penalty of $2500 for each violation of section 3369. The action can be brought
by the Attorney General or by any district attorney. If the action is by the Attorney
General, one-half of the penalty received goes to the county in which the judgment
was entered and one-half to the state's General Fund. Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1084, § 2,
at 2191.
34. The court also observed that plaintiffs stated a cause of action for an injunc-
tion on the grounds of abuse of process. 7 Cal. 3d at 103, 496 P.2d at 824, 101 Cal.
Rptr. at 752. The court discussed the tort concept of abuse of process and based its
decision partially on that theory even though it was not presented in the lower courts.
Appellants further contended that the venue requirements of section 396(a) of the
Code of Civil Procedure were jurisdictional and that because respondent's form com-
plaints did not conform to the section's conditions, all prior judgments obtained by
respondents in the past two years should be set aside as void. Another claim was
that the language of section 1812.10 of the Civil Code (Unruh Act), pertaining to
installment contracts, mandated that the judgments be rendered void. The court did
not uphold these latter two contentions but declared that the venue provisions of sec-
tion 396(a) were not jurisdictional and that at the time plaintiff's suit was initiated
section 1812.10 only applied to installment contracts. Installment accounts, which
plaintiffs had opened, thus were not covered by the statute. 7 Cal. 3d at 123-24,
496 P.2d at 838-39, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 766-67.
However, it should be noted, that since its amendment in 1969, section 1812.10 ap-
plies specifically to installment contracts as well as to installment accounts. CAL.
CIv. CODE § 1812.10 (West Supp. 1972). Also, the Attorney General has indicated that
the requirements of section 1812.10 are jurisdictional and any judgments obtained by not
conforming to the section are void. 51 OP. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 179 (1968).
35. 7 Cal. 3d at 109, 496 P.2d at 828, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
36. Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1084, § 1, at 2190, amending CAL. CIv. CODE § 3369
(West 1970). See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
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behalf or on the public's behalf may seek injunctive relief under the
express terms of the statute. Respondents in Barquis, however, ar-
gued that the section encompassed solely the conventional unfair
competition concepts involving competitive injury and that consumer
protection was not within the scope of the section's coverage.37
The Barquis court, while acknowledging that most of the prior
cases under section 3369 involved attempts to vindicate a trade name
from unfair competition or concerned similar deceptive practices, 8 de-
clared that the section had "broadened the scope of legal protection
against wrongful business practices generally, and in so doing extended
to the entire consuming public the protection once afforded only to
business competitors."39  The opinion drew support from the his-
tory of the section and anologies to litigation under the similar FTC
Act as amended in 193 8,40 which specifically brought consumer pro-
tection within its provisions.41 Finally, the court approved of the con-
struction that section 3369 was given previously in National Re-
search,42 which recognized the attorney general's right to sue on be-
half of consumer interests.43  Deducing that the section was "equally
directed toward 'the right of the public to protection from fraud and
deceit,' ",44 the court held that the language of the section itself, "per-
mitting. . . any member of the public to sue on his own behalf or on
behalf of the public generally" proved "a clear design to protect con-
sumers as well as competitors. 43
While National Research established the attorney general's right
to sue on behalf of the public, without any mention of competition,
Barquis is the first supreme court case to hold that the injured con-
sumer can sue directly under section 3369 without any showing of
competitive injury. The Barquis opinion, however, leaves unan-
swered the question of what limits, if any, exist on this broad inter-
pretation of the standing provision."'
37. 7 Cal. 3d at 109, 496 P.2d at 828, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 756. The court of ap-
peals had agreed with respondents and had given very little attention to appellants'
argument. Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1971).
38. 7 Cal. 3d at 111, 496 P.2d at 829, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 757. See also 19
HAs TiNGs L. 398, 408 (1968).
39. 7 Cal. 3d at 109, 496 P.2d at 828, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
40. 52 Stat. 111, ch. 49, § 3 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
41. Although the Act protects consumers, only the FrC can sue under it. But
see Lovett, Private Actions for Deceptive Trade Practices, 23 ADMIN. L. REv. 271
(1971), for a discussion favoring a private tort action for a violation of the federal act.
42. See text accompanying notes 23-30 supra.
43. See 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962).
44. 7 Cal. 3d at 110, 496 P.2d at 829, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
45. Id. at 110, 496 P.2d at 828, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
46. See CAL. CODE Cry. PRoc. § 367 (West 1954), the real party in interest
February 19731
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Standing Ramifications and the Public Interest Plaintiff
In Barquis the plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief were debtors
personally injured by the practices of the collection agency. However,
the literal language of section 3369 does not impose a finding of such
personal injury as a prerequisite for standing to sue. The Barquis
decision therefore leaves unresolved the issue of whether the plaintiff
must allege any personal interest which is affected adversely. This
matter, however, was recently raised in the court of appeal in Payne v.
United California Bank,47 where the decision ultimately rested on other
grounds.4" Nonetheless, language in that case suggested that if the chal-
lenged activity of the Payne defendants had been within section 3369's
definition of unfair competition, plaintiffs could have sued as private
attorneys general even though they admitted they had not been dam-
aged at all by defendants.49
Analogous situations to the section 3369 issue can be found
both on the federal and state levels, where personal damage is a pre-
requisite to stating a claim. At the state level, the class action is one
example. 50 On the federal level, the United States Supreme Court in
Sierra Club v. Morton51 has mandated that personal injury to the plain-
tiff is a necessary precondition to bringing environmental actions un-
der the Administrative Procedure Act.52 On the other hand, in addi-
statute, which declares that all actions, except those specifically exempted, must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
47. 23 Cal. App. 3d 850, 100 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1972).
48. The question was also raised as far back as 1963 in a comment on the Na-
tional Research case. 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 304, 308-09 (1963).
49. 23 Cal. App. 3d at 855-57, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 675-77.
50. Personal damage is an essential element of the class action. Two requisites
for a class action in California are that: (1) the plaintiff's claim be fairly representa-
tive of the claims of the class and (2) there be a sufficiently shared community of
interest encompassing the claims. See Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800,
484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971). Section 3369 is somewhat similar to the
class action in that one person can sue on behalf of others. Thus, the two above-
mentioned criteria could be adopted to clarify the meaning of section 3369's standing
provision; and, if so, they would imply the necessity of a damaged plaintiff. However,
the class action requirements do not result from the interpretation of a statutory
standing provision but are judicial and legislative attempts to deal with a particular
type of action. The class action example and section 3369 can certainly be distin-
guished.
51. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
52. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), aff'g sub nom. Sierra Club v.
Hickle, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), held that for a party to sue under section ten of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), to review a federal ad-
ministrative agency ruling, he has to show that he has suffered, or will suffer some
injury, economic or otherwise. See Hutchinson, Standing to Sue in Public Interest
Litigation, 7 LINCOLN L. REv. 40 (1972) for a discussion of the Sierra Club case and
its background.
The Sierra Club believed it could sue under the act as a "special interest plain-
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tion to section 3369, there are parallel broad standing provisions in
California 3 and in other states. For example, Michigan recently en-
acted an environmental protection law which allows "any person" to
maintain an action for declartory or equitable relief against anyone
alleged to be engaged in despoiling the natural resources. 54 The word-
ing of the Michigan act's standing provision55 is strikingly similar t6
tiff," claiming to be representative of the general public, without alleging any injury,
economic or aesthetic, to its members. The Supreme Court, however, held against
the club. The Court proclaimed that "a mere 'interest in the problem' no matter
how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in
evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization 'adversely
affected' or 'aggrieved' within the meaning of the A.P.A." 405 U.S. at 739.
Yet the above statement indicated that the Court was speaking of a statute worded
in terms of a party aggrieved or adversely affected. However, section 3369's phrasing
reads "any person" and attaches no such condition of being affected, aggrieved, or
interested. Also, the problem in Sierra Club involved an environmental issue; section
3369 relates, at least potentially, to consumer actions. The distinction may be signifi-
cant in that in the consumer area standing requirements may be less exacting. See
Sierra Club v. HiEckel, 433 F.2d 24, 30 (9th Cir. 1970). Because section 3369 has
historically had a rather unfettered interpretation, there is every indication that the
standing provision will be further liberally construed.
In short, the situations discussed are not as comparable as at first glance; further,
it is arguable that the Sierra Club decision may not even be permanent constitutional
law. The Court was split four to three, with Justices Blackmun, Douglas, and Brennan
writing dissenting opinions. One commentator has termed the case a temporary halt
in the expansion of the law of standing. Hutchinson, Standing to Sue in Public Interest
Litigation, 7 LINcOLN L. REV. 40, 63 (1971). See also 43 Miss. L.J. 538 (1972).
53. Section 526(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure allows any municipal tax-
payer to sue the necessary municipal official to prevent illegal expenditure of funds.
While one could contend that sufficient interest, or damage, is present in the form of
taxation, it is so minimal because suffered by each taxpayer that it amounts to no
more than an interest by virtue of being a municipal citizen . In other words, there
really is no damage requirement at all. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 526(a) (West Supp.
1972). See Wirin v. Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 313 P.2d 844 (1957). See also Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), for the creation of a similar yet more restrictive standing
provision by the judiciary in federal taxpayer suits.
Another instance granting "any person" the ability to sue involves an action to
seek a writ of mandate. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 1086 (West 1955). The statute's
terms allow any person beneficially interested to petition for such a writ. A person
"beneficially interested", relating to judicial review of administrative decisions, has
been interpreted to mean anyone who was a proper party to the administrative action.
W.H. DEERING, CALnonRu ADmIaA~rvr MAhNmAus § 4.2 at 27-28 (Cal. Cont.
Educ. Bar ed. 1966). Similarly, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 24201 (West 1964), allows any person to file a complaint against a
licensee of the ABC Board. Thus, any person is a proper party to the ABC admin-
istrative action. The California Supreme Court has held that any person (with no lim-
itations) who submits a complaint upon which no action is taken must be able to seek a
writ of mandate if the right is of any meaning. Covert v. State Bd. of Equalization,
29 Cal. 2d 125, 130, 173 P.2d 545, 547 (1946).
54. MicH. CoM. LAws ANN. H§ 691.1201-07 (Supp. 1972).
55. Id. § 691.1202 (Supp. 1972).
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section 3369 subsection five and was specifically adopted to dispense
with the normal standing requirement of proving for personal injury.56
Considering the language of section 3369, its previous broad in-
terpretation, 5 8 the dicta in the Payne case 9 and the current consumer
oriented trend in the law, there is no reason why section 3369's stand-
ing provision should be seriously constricted. The courts certainly
possess the necessary means to eliminate any frivolous suits."0 Cer-
tain safeguards to ensure a plaintiff's ability to sue and his integrity
are undoubtedly essential. These safeguards can be framed in terms
that will require the party to demonstrate his adverseness and his po-
sition as honestly representative of the public, but without any re-
quirement of alleging specific injury to himself. 1 However, as noted
previously, this question of standing under section 3369 remains open.
The Definition of Unlawful Business Practice
A second matter of statutory construction presented in the Bar-
quis case encompasses the very scope of section 3369. The act, though
directed at unfair business practice, provides no explicit definition of
the activities prohibited by its terms. Respondents contended that
section 3369 should be limited to injunctions against fraud or de-
ceit.62 That is, they argued that the supression of unfair business
competition was the primary thrust of the section and actions should
be limited to the traditional activities which compose this category.
In rejecting respondents' argument the court did concede that most
section 3369 cases had arisen under the common law notions. 3 How-
ever, the court emphasized that in 1963 the legislature amended the
section to include unlawful business practices within the definition of
unfair competition.64 The Barquis court noted the lack of legislative
56. Sax & Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress
Report, 70 MIcH. L. REv. 1003 (1972).
57. The pertinent portion of the standing provision states that an action may be
prosecuted "by any person acting for the interests of . . . the general public." Cal.
Stat. 1972, ch. 1084, § 1(5), at 2190, amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (West 1970).
58. See text accompanying notes 18-27 supra.
59. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
60. See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450,
468-71 (1970); 32 LA. L. REv. 634, 645-46 (1972). See also MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 691.1202a (Supp. 1972), concerning suits under the new Michigan environ-
mental act, which allows the court to require a plaintiff to post a $500 bond if the
court doubts plaintiff's capability to pay costs or satisfy any judgment rendered against
him.
61. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
See generally 41 U. CiN. L. REv. 669, 684-87 (1972).
62. 7 Cal. 3d at 111, 496 P.2d at 829, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
63. Id.
64. Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 1606, § 1, at 3184.
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history on the amendment and surmised that the addition was an
effort to give equity a flexible hand in combating all the new machin-
ations of the unfairly competitive mind.65 The court quoted one com-
mentator who had suggested that "it is difficult to see any other pur-
pose [of the amendment] than to extend the meaning of unfair com-
petition to anything that can properly be called a business practice and
that at the same time is forbidden by law."6
The first reported appellate case seeking a section 3369 injunc-
tion for unlawful business practice was Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch.67
There, the plaintiff sought to enjoin farm owners from knowingly
hiring Mexican laborers who had illegally entered the United States. The
court refused to grant the injunction, basing its decision primarily on
the overriding federal issues concerned.6" The Diaz court, however,
indicated that the action was otherwise proper under the unlawful
business practice portion of section 3369.69 The Barquis court re-
ferred to the earlier Diaz decision in finding that the Barquis appel-
lants had stated a cause of action. That is, the court held that because
the resondents' activities (1) violated express statute and (2) con-
stituted a regular activity of respondents' business, this conduct could
comprise an unlawful business practice within the purview of section
3369.70 Thus, in Barquis, the term "unlawful" was not confined to
the violation of laws concerning fraudulent or deceptive business prac-
tice, as respondents had urged, 71 but was expanded to include any bus-
iness practice which is independently unlawful. 72 The court thus
severed the term "unlawful" from an exclusive connection with fraud-
ulent or deceptive business practice-the traditional methods of un-
fair competition.
Ramifications of the Expansion of "Unlawful"
Because of the court's construction of "unlawful," not only can
the specific collection agency activities involved in the Barquis case
65. 7 Cal. 3d at 112, 496 P.2d at 830, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
66. 19 HAsTINGs L.J. 398, 408-09 (1968), cited in 7 Cal. 3d at 113, 496 P.2d at
830, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
67. 9 Cal. App. 3d 588, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1970).
68. Id. at 599, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
69. Id. at 591-92 and n.3, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 444-46 and n.3.
70. 7 Cal. 3d at 113, 496 P.2d at 831, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
71. Id. at 111, 496 P.2d at 829, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 757. The court of appeals
did not even discuss the term "unlawful" as used in section 3369. The opinion con-
fined its explanation of unfair competition to the traditional theory of unfair diver-
sions of customers from one competitor to another. Barquis v. Merchants Collection
Ass'n., Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1971).
72. There appears to be very little discussion in any of the decisions on unfair
competition about what constitutes a business practice. See, e.g., Barquis, 7 Cal. 3rd at
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be curbed, but many related debt collection tactics can be enjoined as
well. For example, section 6947 of the Business and Professions Code
details additional prohibited collection agency practices. 73  Barquis
now will allow any one of these activities, if engaged in as a business
practice, to be enjoined under section 3369. The question arises,
though, as to the parameters of the term "unlawful" as used in section
3369. Where a legislative act refers to "laws," normally the term is
confined to statutory laws rather than to the common law, unless a dif-
ferent intent can be found.74  However, "unlawful" implies a broader
definition; it embraces "wrongful", "immoral", "tortious", and "against
public policy." 75  This more inclusive meaning has implications for
consumer protection actions under section 3369.
For example, the Bureau of Collection and Investigative Serv-
ices, under the Department of Consumer Affairs, is empowered to prom-
ulgate regulations to enforce the Business and Professions Code pro-
visions dealing with collection agencies."6 The purpose of such reg-
ulations is to fill gaps left by the legislature. However, the regulations
have the force and effect of law. 77  Accordingly, a violation of a reg-
ulation should be considered unlawful and enjoinable under section
3369. This argument has not been presented to the courts, but hope-
fully the test soon will be forthcoming. The importance of holding that
a regulation violation is unlawful under section 3369 is that the exist-
ing regulations control collection agency activity fairly extensively. 78
Therefore, a section 3369 injunction could be a means of enforcing
these somewhat stringent regulations. The limitation of "unlawful"
to purely statutory violation or contravention of case law would restrict
unnecessarily the broad equitable powers given a court under section
3369.
113, 496 P.2d at 831, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 759. See also 19 HASTINGS L.J. 398, 409
(1968).
73. The section prohibits the use of "deadbeat lists," the simulation of govern-
ment forms, the violation of postal regulations, the use of profanity in collection,
among other activities. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6947 (West Supp. 1972).
74. Gilliam v. California Employment Stabilization Comm'n., 130 Cal. App. 2d
102, 114, 278 P.2d 528, 536 (1955).
75. See, e.g., Loup v. California S.R.R. Co., 63 Cal. 97, 99 (1883); Sultan
Turkish Bath, Inc. v. Board of Police Comm'rs., 169 Cal. App. 2d 188, 200-201,
337 P.2d 203, 210 (1959); BLACK'S LAW DIcIONARY 1705 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
76. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6863 (West 1964).
77. Cf. Nelson v. Dean, 27 Cal. 2d 873, 881, 168 P.2d 16, 21 (1946); First
Indus. Loan Co. v. Daugherty, 26 Cal. 2d 545, 549, 159 P.2d 921, 923 (1945);
Rigley v. Board of Retirement, 260 Cal. App. 2d 445, 450-51, 67 Cal. Rptr. 185, 188
(1968).





Barquis conclusively severed section 3369 from the traditional
concepts of unfair competition, the protection of a business' reputa-
tion and goodwill. The public, as well as business, is entitled to the
benefits of the section; a direct suit by a member of the public with-
out a showing of competition is now permitted. The court's interpre-
tation of the section's standing provision leaves open the question of
the meaning of "any person"; but in keeping with the liberal construc-
tion of the section, the standing requirement probably will not become
overly harsh.
In considering the term "unlawful" as found in the section, the
Barquis court stressed that the word be broadly construed to include
anything unlawful. This interpretation is consistent with the gen-
eral liberal application of the statute and with the progressive Cali-
fornia trend in consumer law. Although the meaning of the term "un-
lawful" has not been definitively resolved, it most likely will not be
shackled to statutory law but will embrace administrative regulations
as well.
Use of section 3369 possesses a large number of assets with few
liabilities. 79  It has great advantages over the criminal sanction;
80
it dispenses with the complicated rules encountered in class action
suits. Furthermore, it now contains a civil penalty."' The final
judgment under the section has the effect of collateral estoppel; and,
thus, the facts determined are binding in future litigation against the
defendant.8 2  The section has a liberal history. There is no indication
of a deviation from this past, nor is there any indication that anti-
consumer limitations will be imposed on the section's future use. In
sum, section 3369 promises to be a powerful consumer tool.
Richard G. Maul*
79. See Lorenz, Consumer Fraud and the San Diego District Attorney's Office,
8 SAN Dmoo L. RPv. 47, 50-52 (1970).
80. Project, The Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A.L
REv. 883, 961 (1969).
81. See note 33 supra.
82. Project, The Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A.L.
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